Hydropower represents an important alternative form of energy in China, a country that currently uses coal to supply 78% of its electricity. However, evidence from large hydropower projects in China show that the socio-economic and environmental costs of hydropower development are substantial. Construction on the first of the 13 planned dams on the Nu River began in the summer of 2008, and villages are already beginning to be displaced. Based on fieldwork in the area, we find that the local resettlement policies infringe upon the national regulations governing resettlement caused by major infrastructure development. This infringement includes high prices for resettlement homes, forcing villagers to leave agricultural production, a lack of programs for long-term economic development, and a lack of transparency in decision-making processes.
I. Introduction
Growth in energy demand in China has been commensurate with the country's rapid economic growth. As a relatively clean form of energy, hydropower represents an important alternative to coal for electricity production since China is rich in water resources and already has advanced technical expertise in building large hydropower stations (Brown, Magee, and Xu 2008) . The 13-dam cascade comprising the Nu River Project is one of biggest hydropower development projects yet conceived in China, and once completed, will have a larger generating capacity than the Three Gorges Dam (Tullos 2009 ). As such, the Project has attracted substantial investment in the form of energy infrastructure and heavy industry to the Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture, 1 and will likely be a large stimulus to local economic development.
After much deliberation and amid the on-going controversy surrounding the Nu River Project, infrastructure for the Liuku Dam began construction in June 2008. As one of the first dams to be built in the cascade, the project has already caused the resettlement of Xiaoshaba village, and if the dam is completed, the rising waters will displace residents in two other villages as well. The resettlement experience at Liuku will undoubtedly be watched carefully by residents likely to be affected by the other 12 dams, as well as both proponents and opponents of the Nu River Project. Because of the precedent it sets for the remaining dams on the Nu River, Liuku provides a vital case study of the resettlement process. including the size and cost of resettlement housing, the lack of provisions to enable residents to continue farming after resettlement, the lack of long-term training and support programs for offfarm activities, and the lack of input regarding the resettlement process from the villagers themselves. We argue that better oversight is needed in order to minimize the negative economic consequences of displacement.
This paper first provides a detailed account of the geography and ecology of the Nu River.
We then describe the socioeconomic situation of the Nu River valley as well as the recent influx of investment following news of the Nu River Project. Next, we describe the proposed 13-dam cascade and progression on its construction in detail. Then, we describe national policies governing the resettlement and compensation processes for infrastructure development in China.
Finally, we present findings from the fieldwork conductedin Liuku and identify apparent violations of the national policy. A brief conclusion ensues.
II. Geography and Ecology of the Nu River Area
"Nu" is a phonetic approximation of the Lisu name for the river, which is "Nong," meaning "angry" (Mertha 2008 degrees. As such, the river is very attractive for hydropower development .
Indeed, with a theoretical hydroelectricity potential of 36,400 MW (Lin and Zhang 2005) , the Nu River Basin is the sixth largest in China in terms of exploitable capacity (Xiang and Zhang 2005) .
The Nu River region is home to a rich collection of flora and fauna. Among the estimated 6,000 species of plants and animals found in the region, 1397 are listed as protected species (Huang 2003) , including 20 "first degree" protected animal species and 40 "second degree"
protected animal species (Luo, Bao, and Li 2005) . 4 There are 48 known species of fish in the Nu River, 70% of which are endemic and four of which are listed as endangered (Magee and McDonald 2009 4 These terms refer to the status of animal species in the wild, with "first degree" species in the greatest danger of extinction. These ratings were coined in the "Wild Animals Protection Act" of 1989, and are updated annually by the State Council (Xinhua 2004) . 5 There are two criteria for a region to be designated as a "biodiversity hotspot." Specifically, it must contain at least 1,500 species of vascular plants and it must have lost at least 70 percent of its original habitat (Conservation International 2007) . Nevertheless, the Nu River area has a relatively low population density ( Table 1) , suggesting that population displacement arising from any dam building will be considerably less severe than elsewhere in population-dense China.
III. Economy of the Nu River Area
The socio-economic status of the prefecture-level regions along the Nu River is summarized in Table 1. All five prefecture-level entities through which the Nu River flows have per capita GDP below the national average, and with the exception of Linzhi Prefecture, all other regions have per capita GDP below the average for the respective provinces. All five regions also depend heavily on subsidies from upper levels of government for fiscal resources.
Linzhi Prefecture, home of the proposed Songta Dam, is the second richest region in Tibet after the capital region of Lhasa (Tibet Bureau of Statistics 2007). Linzhi has a growing economy based on tourism and forestry resources (Yu and Zhang 2008) , making the region a transportation hub for Eastern Tibet. Moreover, Tibet has the greatest theoretical hydropower potential of any administrative entity in China at 201,000 MW, some 70% of which is concentrated in Linzhi Prefecture (Wang 2003) . With a population density of just 1.2/km 2 , displacement is unlikely to be a serious concern of dam construction in this area. As such, hydropower development is at the core of Linzhi's economic development strategy.
Yunnan is the third-poorest province in China in per-capita GDP terms, and Nujiang
Prefecture is ranked seventh out of 16 prefecture-level regions in terms of per-capita GDP Nujiang Prefecture is thereby especially reliant on heavy industry for its income, surpassing traditional industrial hubs such as Yuxi and Kunming. Such reliance on heavy industry is likely to increase in the future as hydropower stations become operational because new dam construction will spark demand for industrial inputs. Indeed, Nujiang Prefecture has already seen rapid increases in mining and refining in recent years, largely on expectations that hydropower will be developed (Liu 2008) .
Not surprisingly, the proposed dams have also attracted a large amount of investment into the energy production sectors in Nujiang Prefecture. In 2006, for example, urban collectiveowned and rural collective-owned enterprises invested a total of RMB 354.45 million in the production and supply of electricity, gas, and water in Yunnan Province, 62.64% of which was 6 The Central Government of China first designated a total of 592 counties as "National Key Poverty Counties" in 1986, which the goal of concentrating financial resources to combat poverty in the poorest regions of China. 2006). However, the population density in Baoshan approaches that of China as a whole,
suggesting that displacement associated with hydropower development in this area may be higher.
IV. The Nu River Project
As early as the 1970s, the Chinese government started conducting preliminary studies on the feasibility of building dams on the main stem of the Nu River. In the National Energy Survey conducted in the 1980s, the government collected information pertaining to dam development on the Nu River. These survey data were later incorporated into the Nu River development plan of 1989, which determined the number of cascades to be constructed on the river. (Chen 2006 ).
In response to Premier Wen's concerns, the NDRC and the National Environmental Protection Agency organized a committee to review hydropower development on the Nu River (Chen 2006) . After more than one year of review, Wenweipo (2006) reported that the committee decided to proceed with construction of four proposed dams, namely Maji, Liuku, Yabiluo, and Saige, on 11 January 2006. The environmental assessments on the four dams were concluded at that time, but because the Nu is a trans-boundary river, the results of the assessment were kept confidential (Wenweipo 2006 ).
On 18 March 2008, the NDRC issued "The Plan on the Development of Renewable Energy during the 'Eleventh Five Year Plan Period,'" which officially announced that the Liuku and Saige dams would start construction before 2010 (Shi 2008) . 9 The exclusion of the other 11 initially proposed dams also indicate that construction will most likely not start on these projects within the eleventh Five-Year Plan period (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) .
The technical details of the 13 dams and the investment levels of the individual projects are summarized in arising from hydropower development, but with generally higher remuneration levels. Moreover, the regulations set out to clearly establish the rights and responsibilities of both evacuees and various levels of government in the resettlement process.
Appendix 1 provides a summary of the most pertinent sections of the regulations. For example, the compensation standard for inundated land is 16 times the value of average annual production. In contrast to the 1991 regulations, houses and trees that belong to the evacuees were to be compensated regardless of whether they were to be inundated because households would lose access to their use after resettlement. Third, local governments are charged with ensuring that living standards do not deteriorate as a result of resettlement by ensuring that farmers have the same amount of land and other factors of production as people already residing in the resettlement area. These processes are to be supervised by upper levels of government. Moreover, the national policy requires that the local government take into consideration the opinions of local residents. One manifestation of this is that houses for resettled rural residents are to be built by the farmers themselves, and the law specifically bans local governments from mandating construction standards. Finally, the regulations also stipulate that local governments establish long-term economic support programs to help resettled people quickly achieve economic enfranchisement.
VI. Case Study of the Liuku Dam
At 35 Xin Village is typical of the area. The predominant crops grown in the village include corn and rice (Table 3) . At the end of collective farming, each resident of Xin Village was allocated approximately one mu of dry land and 0.85 mu of paddy land. 13 Given the marginal quality of much of the land, fertilizer represents a major expense. Coupled with marginal marketing opportunities, per capita farming incomes vary between RMB 1000 and RMB 2000 depending on the year. 14 11 Like many villages in China, Xiaoshaba consists of several "natural villages." The natural villages that will be affected be the Liuku Dam are called "Group One," "Group Two," and "Group Three." 12 The authors gratefully acknowledge the Goldfarb Center for Civic Affairs and Public Engagement for underwriting the data collection. 13 One mu is just under 1/6 acre. 14 At the time of the survey, US$ 1 = RMB 6.8 at official exchange rates.
Households in Xin Village and other affected areas will be impacted by the Liuku Dam in two ways. First, households that have property in the "inundated area" will permanently lose access to their land. Second, households that have property in the "construction area" will lose access to the land during the two-year construction process. Land in the construction area will be used for producing and transporting construction materials, such as stones and sand. This land will also be used for sheltering construction workers.
The detailed compensation scheme for construction area land was publicly posted in Xin
Village by the Lushui County government. Compensation for land lost to construction purposes depends on current land use, i.e., whether the land is used to cultivate vegetables, rice, or corn (Table 4) . Initially, farmers were to be compensated RMB 1990 annually per mu of land suitable for growing vegetables, RMB 1660 annually per mu of paddy land, and RMB 980 annually per mu of dry land. However, the county government revised the compensation upward by 25% regardless of land type effective 1 November 2007. Therefore, land appropriated for construction purposes prior to 1 November 2007 (which was widespread in Xiaoshaba Village) was compensated at a lower price than land appropriated after this date. Compensation is to be paid over time (Green SOS 2008) , although the exact schedule remains unclear.
As of June 2008, no official announcement regarding the compensation for inundation land had been made. In addition to compensation for inundated land and land claimed for construction purposes, people who are resettled are eligible to receive a one-time resettlement payment from the Yunnan Huadian Nujiang Hydroelectricity Development Corporation. Again, neither the level of compensation nor the payment schedule has been announced officially.
15
15 Despite the lack of official announcements, rumors about the levels of compensation were circulating throughout the villages during our site visits: compensation for inundation land was rumored to be RMB 17,000 for dry land and RMB 27,000 for paddy land, and the lump-sum resettlement payment was rumored to be between RMB 10,000 and RMB 40,000 per person.
All 144 households in three natural villages in Xiaoshaba were resettled to New Xiaoshaba Village in January 2007, and the resettlement experience of villagers in Xiaoshaba may serve as an indication of key challenges that further resettlement caused by hydropower projects on the Nu River will face. During site visits, it was found that many policies enacted for resettlement were in direct conflict with the national policies described in Section V. Of particular concern to displaced villagers were the size and cost of resettlement housing, the lack of provisions to enable residents to continue farming after resettlement, the lack of long-term training and economic development programs, and the lack of input regarding the resettlement process from the villagers themselves.
Resettlement Housing
The construction of New Xiaoshaba Village was part of the national drive to build "New Socialist Villages" in the rural countryside. As with such villages built elsewhere in China, the new village consists of modern two-story houses carefully aligned along straight roads. There are two types of housing -those with small yards for growing fruits and vegetables for personal use (referred to as "agricultural housing") and those without yards ("business housing"). Regardless of housing type, the first floor is designed to be a storefront and the second floor is designed to be used for residential purposes.
The residents relocated to the new village were required to purchase their new houses for RMB 116,700. Part of the price is defrayed by converting the value of their old houses, their residential land, and in some cases, the value of their trees. However, an average household still owed the village approximately RMB 20,000 after compensation for these assets. Regardless, residents generally considered the resettlement housing to be too small. 
Leaving Agriculture
Although residents of Xiaoshaba still had access to land in the old village during the 2008 site visit, they are certain to lose that land after inundation. Moreover, the local government made no provisions for allocating new farmland to displaced farmers, a violation of Chapter 2, Article 13 of the national regulations. Given that both "business homes" and "agricultural homes" are designed to accommodate storefronts on their first floors, it is clear that the local government expects villagers to shift from agricultural production to non-agricultural activities for their livelihoods. However, it is hard to imagine these households being able to establish sustainable businesses given the small market and the large number of competing storefronts. Moreover, interviewees in Xiaoshaba expressed concerns over their lack of experience in conducting business and their desire to continue agricultural production.
Lack of Long-Term Economic Development
All of the interviewees in Xiaoshaba expressed concern about their future livelihoods, in large part because none had been informed about post-resettlement assistance programs. The lack of long-term support programs such as job training, business management classes, and community development programs is in clear violation of Chapter Five of the national regulations, which stipulate the provision of such programs in order to allow evacuees to quickly return to economic independence. Post-resettlement assistance programs are especially crucial for residents who have traditionally engaged in agricultural production and who are unfamiliar with off-farm jobs.
Moreover, given the ethnic diversity of the Nu River region, community development and organization programs may prove crucial to ensuring that the resettled people and people in host communities can live harmoniously. Furthermore, several area residents expressed concern that with poor training in business and with few outlets for productive uses, large inflows of cash may foster social problems such as drug abuse.
Lack of Input from Villagers
Apart from being offered the opportunity to choose between "agricultural homes" and "business homes," interviewees in Xiaoshaba unanimously expressed that they did not have a participatory stake in planning for resettlement. Indeed, all interviewees expressed confusion regarding the details of resettlement. Although public meetings were held on the issue of resettlement prior to 2006, the residents that were interviewed believed that their opinions were not taken into account.
Indeed, according to interviews conducted by journalists near Liuku in early 2006, local residents characterized the meetings as being "intimidating" and complained that their opinions were disregarded by planning authorities (Green Home 2006) .
The lack of input from the villagers is a violation of Article 2, Chapter 9 of the national regulations. This violation is especially troublesome because the fieldwork revealed that the vast (i) That compensation for land be paid in full, instead of being paid in the form of rent for construction land; (ii) That full compensation standards for land must be no less than RMB 100,000 for every mu of residential land, private-use land, and paddy land; RMB 80,000 for every mu of dry land; RMB 500 for each mature fruit tree; RMB 300 for each fruit seedling; RMB 80 for each coffee tree; RMB 50 for each tea bush; and RMB 250 per month as poverty subsidy; (iii) That the government should immediately issue home ownership certificates to the resettled residents; (iv) That the government should re-measure and compensate farmers for slope land under cultivation; (v) That the local government should allocate public land for grazing cattle; (vi) That unused land in the new village must be managed by the villagers or distributed to individual households; and (vii) That the government exchange residential land in the old village for additional land in the new village on a one-for-one basis
VII. Implications for Other Inundated Communities
Although Xiaoshaba was the first village to be resettled as part of the Nu River Project, the range of irregularities that took place during the resettlement process raises flags for future resettlement efforts in the area. First, residents expressed an emotional attachment to their land and their traditional means of production. Therefore, the local government might consider providing future evacuees with the option of either choosing compensation in the form of land or money. For residents choosing monetary compensation, the local government could offer guidance as to help affected persons to better manage their finances. Moreover, vocational training programs could be established to help evacuees find employment in non-agricultural sectors and to help them operate their own businesses.
In addition, constructing resettlement villages requires careful planning, including input from local residents in the form of public hearings. We do not believe that evacuees should face restrictions regarding in their choices of resettlement housing, i.e., housing should not be built on the presumption that all evacuees will operate shops. Moreover, resettled residents could have the option of building the houses themselves as a means of keeping construction costs low and transparent. Should the villagers decide to build houses on behalf of the evacuees, we advocate a transparent bidding process to prevent rent-seeking.
More generally, we advocate for more transparency regarding the dissemination of information related to resettlement and dam construction. Plans for compensation should be especially transparent as this is of particular interest to evacuees. The government would also be well served by disclosing compensation schemes in a timely manner to reduce uncertainty and to allow farmers to make future plans. More generally, these experiences suggest the need for additional supervision of the Nu River Project on the part of the central government to ensure that local resettlement policies are in accordance with national laws.
VIII. Conclusion
Sustaining China's economic development requires continued increases in energy production.
Currently, 78% of the country's electricity supply comes from coal burning, the negative consequences of which include high CO 2 emissions, acid rain, and clogged railroads.
Hydropower presents an appealing alternative to coal burning as a relatively clean source of power, in part because China is rich in water resources and because it has already mastered advanced technology in building large dams. Indeed, China could support approximately 45% of its current energy consumption if the dams that have already been approved for constructionnot including those on the Nu -were built and operating at full capacity (Brown et al. 2008 .
However, both the central government and local authorities should be mindful of the considerable environmental costs of damming major rivers and the significant social and economic costs related to the ensuing displacement of local residents.
This paper is primarily concerned with the latter. The Nu River Project will undoubtedly impact the economy of southwestern China by providing this economically backward region with the infrastructure necessary to attract heavy industry and the prospect of rapid economic development. However, fieldwork in Liuku indicates that some aspects of the local resettlement plan appear to violate the national regulations pertaining to resettlement issued in 2006.
Specifically, the high price of resettlement homes, the lack of continued opportunities in agricultural production, the lack of long-term economic development programs, and the lack of input from the villagers themselves are four major areas in which the resettlement plan appears to violate national policy. Since the resettlement process for the Liuku Dam will undoubtedly be watched by others who may be impacted by dam development along the Nu River, these infringements negatively affect the prospect of public support for the entire Nu River Project.
This paper does not take a stance on the issue of whether the Nu River Project should proceed. However, if it does proceed, we advocate for improving the resettlement policy for households affected by the Liuku Dam to bring it in line with the national regulations. Doing so would engage local residents in decision-making regarding the resettlement process, would better provide for their livelihoods after resettlement, and would help to achieve buy-in from those who are most directly affected by hydropower development.
The central government appears to share these sentiments. In particular, in April 2009, Premier Wen again ordered a halt to the entire Nu River Project -including the Liuku Dam -to allow time for additional environmental and economic impact assessments (Shi 2009 The country adopts a resettlement policy that is aimed at furthering economic development. The resettlement policy is a combination of compensation and subsidy payments before resettlement and financial support after the resettlement, which must enable the resettled people to enjoy living standards at par with, or exceeding, their original living standards. Chapter Two, Article 9
During the planning stage for the resettlement plan, the opinions and attitudes of the resettled people and people living in the designated resettlement area should be taken into full consideration. And, when necessary, public hearings should be held. Chapter Two, Article 13
Rural residents who are primarily engaged in agricultural production should be resettled primarily to locations that facilitate continued agricultural production… After resettlement, farmers should have equal amounts of land and other factors of production as people already living in the designated resettlement area. Chapter Two, Article 22
For farmland used for the construction of large to medium scale water conservancy and hydropower projects, the compensation payment and the resettlement subsidy should be 16 times the average production value of the land during the past three years. If land compensation payments and resettlement subsidies cannot maintain the living standards of the resettled people at their original levels, the payment standards should be increased… Trees and seedlings on the land taken up should also be compensated according to the standards of the province, autonomous region, and municipality that in which construction is taking place. Buildings on the land should be compensated according to the principle that the compensation should enable the re-construction of the building with the same scale, same standard, and same function. For poor evacuees whose compensation payment is insufficient to construct basic shelter, an adequate subsidy should be offered… Chapter Two, Article 25
Farmland used by the construction process should be compensated with an equal area farmland elsewhere… However, cultivation land with a slope of over 25 degrees does not need to be re-developed elsewhere. Chapter Three, Article 33
Resettlement payment and compensation payment for houses, structures attached to the houses, trees, seedlings, and other agricultural and agricultural related equipment should be given directly to the evacuees in full by the county-level government in the resettlement area. 
